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Instructions on Reasonable Doubt: Defining the Standard of Proof and the Juror’s Task 
‘Reasonable doubt’ (RD) is the standard of proof used in criminal trials. It specifies 
the degree of belief in (or probability of) guilt required for conviction. As a principle of due 
process that aims to minimize the number of false convictions, RD is a stringent threshold. It 
has been theorized to be numerically equivalent to a .90 (or 90%) level of certainty following 
Blackstone’s ratio of it being preferable to acquit 10 guilty persons rather than convict one 
innocent person (see Blackstone, 1765; Laudan, 2003; McCauliff, 1982; Newman, 1993; 
United States v. Fatico, 1978).  
Researchers using direct rating scales to quantify people’s interpretations of RD have 
shown that although some judges and (mock) jurors do interpret the standard at around .90 or 
above (e.g., Martin & Schum, 1987; Montgomery, 1998; Zander, 2000), others have much 
lower interpretations (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; Wright & Hall, 
2007). In addition, there is considerable inter-individual variability in interpretations, 
meaning that different people interpret RD differently (for a review see Hastie, 1993). Recent 
research also points to intra-individual variability in interpretations such that an individual 
may interpret the standard as anywhere from around .50 to over .90 (Dhami, 2008; 
Lundrigan, Dhami & Mueller-Johnson, 2013, 2014; Mueller-Johnson, Dhami & Lundrigan, 
2014). 
Several jurisdictions have attempted to improve people’s comprehension of the 
standard and bring its interpretation closer to that intended, as well as reduce variability in 
interpretations. These efforts have largely involved the development and introduction of 
judicial instructions that allow the judge to define RD to jurors using standardized 
terminology. To date, a variety of instructions on RD have been developed (see Heffer, 2006; 
Hemmens, Scarborough & Del Carmen, 1997; Power, 1999). Hemmens et al. (1997) 
identified at least six different instructions on RD used in the US federal courts of appeal, and 
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many more used across different US States (e.g., ‘doubt based on reason’, ‘actual and 
substantial doubt’, ‘doubt that can be articulated’, and ‘moral certainty of guilt’). 
In the present paper, we measure the effectiveness of two specific instructions on RD 
that have been used and challenged in the US. These are described in more detail below. We 
examine the effect of the two instructions on people’s quantitative interpretations of the 
standard, as well as the degree of inter- and intra-individual variability in interpretations. In 
addition, we attempt to explain the effectiveness of these instructions by examining the effect 
of their precise wording on interpretations of RD.  
It is important to study the language of RD instructions because criminal convictions 
can be appealed on the basis that the standard was defined inappropriately (i.e., leading to a 
reduced threshold for conviction; see Power, 1999; e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 1990; Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 1993). In addition, appeals courts have sometimes refused to reverse a decision 
when certain language has been used in the context of other language, implying that any 
problems with some parts of an RD instruction can be cancelled out or corrected by other 
parts (e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 1994; United States v. Emalfarb, 1973; United States v. 
Miller, 1996). Before describing the RD instructions of interest in the present study, we 
review relevant theory and past research on the topic. 
Reasonable Doubt as a Fuzzy Concept 
Theory of Linguistic Probabilities 
According to some researchers, standards of proof such as RD are akin to linguistic 
probabilities such as ‘very likely’ that are used to understand and communicate uncertainty 
(see Clermont, 1987, 2013; Dhami, 2008; Schum, 1986). The numerical equivalent of these 
phrases would lie along the 0-1 probability scale. Indeed, RD is said to be equivalent to a .9 
probability. Wallsten and Budescu’s (1995) theory of linguistic probabilities borrows from 
Zadeh’s (1965) theory of fuzzy sets in mathematics, and states that these phrases can be 
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represented as fuzzy subsets of the probability interval (see also Budescu & Wallsten, 1995). 
A phrase such as RD would thus be characterized by a peak and spread of probabilities called 
a membership function (MF). 
Figure 1 provides an example of a MF for an individual juror. Here, the degree of 
membership of RD at probabilities 0 to .5 is 0 because the juror believes that RD is not at all 
described by these very low probability values. The degree of membership of RD at 
probabilities .51 to .89 are closer to 1 because the juror believes that to some degree RD can 
be described by these mid-range values. The degree of membership of RD at probability .90 
is 1 because the juror believes that RD can be described absolutely by this probability value. 
Finally, the degree of membership of RD at probabilities .91 to 1 are again 0 because the 
juror believes that RD is not at all described by these higher values. According to Wallsten 
and Budescu (1995), the MF of RD for this juror would peak at .9 and have a spread of .4. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Comparing MF peaks across people demonstrates the extent of inter-individual 
variability in interpretations of RD, whereas an examination of the spread of an individual’s 
MF demonstrates intra-individual variability in interpretations. Past research on linguistic 
probabilities has found that people have broad interpretations for most phrases in their 
linguistic probability lexicons, and that interpretations of the same phrase differ across people 
(e.g., Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; Erev & Cohen, 1990; 
Karelitz & Budescu, 2004; Zwick & Wallsten, 1989). Interpretations may also be affected by 
the context in which a phrase is used (e.g., Harris & Corner, 2011; Smithson, Budescu, 
Broomell, & Por, 2012; Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox, 1986; Weber & Hilton, 1990).  
Therefore, one goal of RD instructions should be to encourage peak interpretations of 
the standard to be close to that intended (i.e., .9) for all individuals. This also reduces inter-
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individual variability. Another goal should be to reduce the spread of interpretations along 
the probability scale for each person, thus reducing intra-individual variability. 
Past Research on Reasonable Doubt Instructions 
There is a growing body of research on the effectiveness of RD instructions (for a 
review see Horowitz, 1997; Stoffelmayr & Diamond, 2000). However, most of this research 
has used quantitative measures of interpretations of RD that yield only point estimates on the 
0-1 probability scale. Here, several researchers have compared the effect of specific RD 
instructions with a condition where the standard is left undefined. Some of these studies show 
that interpretations of RD are around .90 under some definitions compared to when the 
standard is left undefined (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, 
Holt & Davis, 1976; see also Elwork, Sales & Alfini, 1982). For example, in an early study, 
Kerr et al. (1976) used a simulated rape trial and found that when RD was defined as ‘any 
doubt’, mock jurors had significantly higher interpretations of the standard compared to when 
RD was undefined or when it was defined as ‘substantial doubt’.  
However, other studies do not necessarily support this beneficial view of instructions 
(e.g., Dhami, 2008; Koch & Devine, 1999; Kramer & Koenig, 1990; Montgomery, 1998; 
Mueller-Johnson et al., 2013; Wright & Hall, 2007). For instance, Koch and Devine (1999) 
found that participants rendered more guilty verdicts under the ‘firmly convinced’ instruction 
used in the US federal courts than when the standard was undefined, implying that the 
instruction did not lead to higher interpretations of RD.  
Other researchers have compared the relative effect of different RD instructions on 
interpretations of the standard (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; 
Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985; Kerr et al., 1976; Nagel, 1979; Mueller-Johnson et al., 2013; see 
also Horowitz, 1990). These studies have found that some instructions lead people to adopt a 
more stringent standard while other instructions lead them to adopt a more lax standard. For 
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example, in the context of a hypothetical murder case where the strength of the evidence was 
manipulated to be weak or strong, Horowitz and Kirkpatrick (1996) compared interpretations 
of RD under four different instructions used in the US (i.e., ‘firmly convinced’, ‘moral 
certainty’, ‘does not waiver or vacillate’, and ‘real doubt’) as well as when the standard was 
left undefined. Mock jurors grouped into six person juries provided their interpretations of 
RD at both the pre- and post-deliberation stages. It was found that at both stages, and for both 
levels of evidence strength, the most stringent interpretations of RD were under the ‘firmly 
convinced’ instruction. The most lax interpretations of RD varied across conditions (i.e. 
‘moral certainty’ in the strong evidence/pre and post-deliberation conditions; 
‘waiver/vacillate’ in the weak evidence/post-deliberation condition; and undefined in the 
weak evidence/pre-deliberation condition).  
Where instructions on RD could be of value is in efforts at reducing the variability in 
interpretations of the standard. Mueller-Johnson et al. (2014) captured the MFs of mock 
jurors’ interpretations of RD under the ‘firmly convinced’ instruction and the ‘sure’ 
instruction which is used in the UK (see also Dhami, 2008). It was found that there was 
greater inter-individual variability in interpretations of RD under the ‘sure’ than ‘firmly 
convinced’ instruction or when the standard was undefined. In relation to intra-individual 
variability, both instructions led to a similarly high level of variability compared to when the 
standard was left undefined. Thus, despite the introduction of RD instructions, courts may 
often be ineffective in communicating the standard to jurors.  
Unfortunately, much of the above literature does not directly investigate reasons for 
the observed (in)effectiveness of RD instructions. One potential explanation for why 
instructions on RD may fail to achieve their objective refers to the psycholinguistic 
complexity of these instructions (e.g., Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Dumas, 2000; Elwork et 
al., 1982; Heffer, 2006; Solan, 2001; Power, 1999). For instance, the grammatical structure of 
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instructions can be poor, and the instructions may be quite lengthy. In addition, although RD 
is not a phrase that is commonly used in everyday language, terms or phrases used to define 
RD are often similarly unusual, and these may themselves be used in the context of further 
unusual language. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. Lifchus (1997) states that 
RD is not ‘an imaginary or frivolous doubt’, nor is it based on ‘sympathy or prejudice.’ It is 
doubt based on ‘reason and commonsense’, and does not mean ‘probably guilty’ or ‘absolute 
certainty.’ Thus, efforts to understand how RD instructions affect jurors’ interpretations of 
the standard should systematically examine the precise language used to define the standard. 
Reasonable Doubt Defined as ‘Proof-Willing’ and ‘Doubt-Hesitate’ 
In the present study, we examine the effects of the language that appears in two 
different RD instructions used in 15 US States (e.g., Hemmens et al., 1997). For brevity, we 
refer to these instructions as ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’. The ‘proof-willing’ 
instruction can be traced back to 1887 when the Supreme Court upheld its use in Hopt v. 
State of Utah. It is currently endorsed in five US States. For example, Ohio uses the 
following ‘proof-willing’ instruction: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such 
character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most 
important of the person's own affairs.” (Ohio Jury Instructions, 2008, CR 417).  
The ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction dates back to at least 1922 (Newman, 1993; Posey v. 
State of Alabama, 1922) and is currently used in 10 US States. Pennsylvania uses the 
following ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction: “A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a 
reasonably careful and sensible person to pause and hesitate before acting upon a matter of 
importance in his or her own affairs.” (Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury 
Instructions, 2008, 7.01). 
Both instructions have been the subject of many legal debates (e.g., see Fortunator, 
1996; Laudan, 2003; Power, 1999). However, these debates have largely centered on whether 
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it is appropriate to equate jury verdicts in criminal trials with important decisions made in 
ordinary life. Although this analogy is used in both the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ 
instructions, courts have generally favored the ‘doubt-hesitate’ over the ‘proof-willing’ 
instruction (e.g., Holland v. US, 1954; Poulson v. State of Texas, 1999; US v. Mars, 1977; 
Wainwright v. US, 1999). It is therefore unclear on what basis the courts prefer one 
instruction over the other. 
In addition, the courts have not explicitly taken into account the fact that the phrases 
‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ are confounded with the words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’, 
respectively. In the ‘proof-willing’ instruction, the phase ‘willing to act’ appears in 
conjunction with the word ‘proof’, whereas in the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction, ‘hesitate to 
act’ is combined with ‘doubt’. It is conceivable that these phrases and words could have 
independent effects on how RD is interpreted or that they have an interactive effect.  
Indeed, the language of the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions is of 
particular interest because beyond defining the standard of proof, it appears to guide jurors in 
the tasks of evidence evaluation and conviction in different ways. In terms of evidence 
evaluation, the words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’ appear to ask jurors to consider evidence as 
providing proof of guilt versus signifying doubt in guilt, respectively. In terms of conviction, 
the phrases ‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ appear to ask jurors to perform an action (i.e., 
to convict) or not to act (i.e., not to convict), respectively. Thus, the ‘proof-willing’ 
instruction appears to ask jurors to consider evidence as providing proof of guilt and to act to 
convict (see e.g., Van Gundy v. State of Ohio, 1992 and Cooper v. State of Alaska, 2008). By 
contrast, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction appears to ask jurors to consider evidence as 
signifying doubt in guilt and not act (or hesitate) to convict (see e.g., Harris v. State of Idaho, 
2001 and Laramore v. State of Idaho, 2007). It is conceivable that by using different 
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terminology and by defining the jurors’ tasks of evidence evaluation and conviction 
differently, the two instructions also have differential effects on jurors’ interpretations of RD.  
The Present Study 
To our knowledge, no past research has empirically studied the ‘proof-willing’ and 
‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions, and the present study represents a first attempt to do so. The 
study had four aims. The first was to compare the effect of the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-
hesitate’ instructions on people’s quantitative interpretations of RD. The second aim was to 
compare the degree of inter-individual variability in interpretations of the standard under 
these two instructions. The third was to compare the degree of intra-individual variability in 
interpretations of RD under the two instructions. The final aim was to explain the effect of 
the two instructions by examining how their precise language influences interpretations of 
RD. In particular, we measured how the phrases ‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ and the 
words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’ affect interpretations of the standard in isolation/independently of 
each other and in conjunction with one another. 
A lack of past research on the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions, as 
well as on the specific language contained in these instructions (i.e., ‘willing to act’, ‘hesitate 
to act’, ‘proof’, and ‘doubt’) precluded a priori directional hypotheses as to their effects on 
interpretations of RD. However, past research on RD instructions generally (see e.g., Hastie, 
1993; Dhami, 2008) and past research on linguistic probabilities (see e.g., Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1995; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005) as reviewed above, led us to expect inter- and 
intra-individual variability in interpretations of RD under both instructions.  
Method 
Participants 
The study involved 200 members of the jury eligible public recruited from a large 
pharmaceutical company in the UK that has a multi-building site and employs over 700 
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people in a wide range of roles from packers through clerical staff to medics. They 
volunteered to participate in return for a payment of £10. The mean age was 35.87 (SD = 
10.68). Fifty-two percent of the sample was female, and 94.0% described their ethnicity as 
White. Fifty-three percent had a university-level education, and 89.5% were employed (the 
unemployed were unpaid interns and volunteers). Eight percent of the sample reported having 
served on a jury before. On average, participants rated the likelihood of them attending jury 
service if they were called to do so, as being 76.4% (SD = 29.8). 
Design and Stimuli 
We studied the effects of the two existing instructions using a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
factorial design. This resulted in four RD instructions, two of which represent the existing 
instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’) and two of which help to de-confound 
the phrases ‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ from the words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’. The four 
instructions were written as follows:  
· “Reasonable doubt is proof that would make a reasonable person willing to act in their 
most important affairs of life.” (Hereafter called ‘proof-willing’) 
· “Reasonable doubt is doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in 
their most important affairs of life.” (‘Doubt-hesitate’).  
· “Reasonable doubt is proof that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in 
their most important affairs of life.” (‘Proof-hesitate’). 
· “Reasonable doubt is doubt that would make a reasonable person willing to act in 
their most important affairs of life.” (‘Doubt-willing’). 
 To a native English speaker, the latter two definitions will appear to be 
grammatically inappropriate. However, we could find no other way to test the independent 
and relative effect of the precise language of the instructions. If we had added more (and 
different) language to improve the grammar of each instruction (e.g., “Reasonable doubt is 
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that lack of proof which would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in their most 
important affairs of life” or “reasonable doubt is that amount of doubt by which a reasonable 
person would nevertheless be willing to act in their most important affairs of life”) this would 
have introduced confounds into the experiment, making it difficult to isolate the effects of the 
language of interest from the additional words (e.g., ‘lack of’, ‘amount of’, and ‘would 
nevertheless). On the other hand, if we added language similarly to each instruction (e.g., 
“Reasonable doubt is a level of proof that would make a reasonable person still hesitate to act 
in their most important affairs of life” or “reasonable doubt is a level of doubt that would 
make a reasonable person still willing to act in their most important affairs of life), it would 
be difficult to disentangle the effects of the additional words (e.g., ‘still’) from the language 
of interest.   
Importantly, we are not interested in comparing across all four instructions, but rather 
across the two existing instructions, and primarily interested in isolating the effects of the 
specific language i.e., ‘willing to act’, ‘hesitate to act’, ‘proof’, and ‘doubt’. At the beginning 
of the study, the second author (who collected the data) told participants to ask for help if 
they did not fully understand the instructions or the task, and at the end of the study, she 
asked participants how well they had understood what was asked of them. None of the 
participants in the two non-existent conditions had questions or reported difficulties. The 
results also suggest a pattern of responses consistent with the idea that participants were not 
confused and unsystematically variable in their responses.  
Measures 
Participants’ interpretations of RD were measured using two methods. One was the 
direct rating method. This yields a point numerical estimate and has been commonly 
employed in past research (see Dhami, 2008; Hastie, 1993; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; 
Lundrigan et al., 2013, 2014; Montgomery, 1998). Here, after reading the RD instruction, 
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participants were asked: “How much [proof/doubt] would make you [hesitate/willing] to find 
someone guilty of a crime?” Responses were provided on a 0-100% scale (with 5% intervals; 
21-points). 
Since the direct rating method does not capture intra-individual variability in 
interpretations, we also used the Membership Function (MF) method (see Dhami & Wallsten, 
2005; Karelitz & Budescu, 2004), which is associated with Wallsten and Budescu’s (1995) 
theory of linguistic probabilities. The MF method was restricted to the two existing RD 
instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’). Dhami (2008) first introduced this 
method for studying standards of proof. In the present study, after reading the instruction, 
participants were presented with 21 scales that each corresponded to one of 21 values, from 
0% to 100% (in 5% intervals; see Figure 2). Each scale had 21-point points and was labeled 
at each from not at all to absolutely. Participants were asked: “Decide how well you think 
each percentage substitutes for the phrase [proof/doubt] doubt that would make a reasonable 
person [willing/hesitate] to act in their most important affairs of life. In other words, imagine 
each percentage in front of the word [proof/doubt] and decide to what extent each percentage 
would make you [willing/hesitate] to act in your most important affairs of life.” Participants 
responded by circling a point on each scale. As Figure 2 shows, the MF method provides 
three measures: the ‘minimum’ value that can be substituted for RD, the ‘peak’ value that 
absolutely substitutes for RD, and ‘spread’ of values that represent RD to varying degrees.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Procedure 
Posters advertising the study were placed across the multi-building site from where 
the participants were recruited, and emails asking for volunteers were sent out to all 
employees. Data was collected from individuals in small groups over three days. The 
experiment took individuals on average 15 minutes to complete. 
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Participants were asked to imagine that they were serving on a jury in a criminal trial 
and that after hearing all the evidence for and against the person, the judge instructs them on 
the standard of proof (there was no case material to consider, however). Each participant read 
one of the four written RD instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’, ‘doubt-hesitate’, ‘proof-
hesitate’, and ‘doubt-willing’). An equal number of participants read each instruction (i.e., 50 
in each condition).  
All participants provided their interpretations of RD using the direct rating method. 
Participants in the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ conditions also provided their 
interpretations using the MF method, and the order of methods was counter-balanced across 
these participants. Finally, data was collected on participants’ demographic characteristics 
including their age, gender, educational background, employment status, and jury experience.  
Results 
Below, we present the analyses and results in order of the four aims listed earlier.  
Interpretations of RD under Existing Instructions  
The first aim was to compare the effect of the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ 
instructions on people’s quantitative interpretations of RD. Since participants in these two 
conditions had provided their quantitative interpretations using both the direct rating and MF 
methods, we first examined the association between the two measures. There was a 
significant positive correlation of .50 between the point estimate yielded by the direct rating 
method and the MF peak, p < .001. However, a paired-samples t-test revealed a significant 
difference in the mean interpretation provided by the MF peak and the direct rating method, t 
[79] = 6.75, p < .001 (see below). Given that the measures provided by the two methods were 
not fully redundant, we analyzed them separately. 
Under the ‘proof-willing’ instruction, the mean interpretation of RD elicited by the 
direct rating method was 89.10 (SD = 8.12), and the mean (peak) interpretation captured by 
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the MF method was 94.63 (SD = 10.71; see Table 1). Under the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction 
the mean interpretations of RD according to the direct rating and MF methods were 39.90 
(SD = 28.04) and 79.13 (SD = 24.67), respectively. Independent samples t-tests showed that 
the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction led to significantly lower interpretations of the standard than 
did the ‘proof-willing’ instruction both when measured by the direct rating method (t[98] = 
11.92, p < .001) and the MF method, t(78) = 3.65, p < .001.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, the MF method also captures the minimum interpretation of RD. As Table 1 
shows, the minimum interpretation of RD was significantly lower under the ‘doubt-hesitate’ 
than the ‘proof-willing’ instruction, t(78) = 4.22, p < .001.  
Inter-individual Variability in Interpretations of RD 
The second aim was to compare the degree of inter-individual variability in 
interpretations of RD under the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions. An 
inspection of the standard deviations of the mean provided by the direct rating method and 
the mean MF peak in Table 1, shows that there was considerable variability across 
individuals’ interpretations of the standard. A Levene’s test revealed that the standard 
deviation of the mean MF peak was significantly greater under the ‘doubt-hesitate’ than 
‘proof-willing’ instruction, F(1, 78) = 19.15, p < .001. Similarly, the standard deviation of the 
mean interpretation elicited by the direct rating method was significantly greater under the 
‘doubt-hesitate’ than ‘proof-willing’ instruction, F(1, 98) = 28.03, p < .001 
Intra-individual Variability in Interpretations of RD 
Only the MF method provides a measure of intra-individual variability (i.e., spread) 
of interpretations of RD. As expected, there was considerable intra-individual variability in 
interpretations of the standard under both the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions 
(see Table 1). An independent samples t-test revealed that the spread of interpretations was 
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significantly greater under the ‘doubt-hesitate’ than the ‘proof-willing’ instruction, t(78) = 
4.19, p < .001.  
Effects of ‘Willing v. Hesitate to Act’ and ‘Proof v. Doubt’ Language on Interpretations 
of RD  
The final aim was to explain the effect of the two instructions by examining how their 
language influences interpretations of RD. In particular, we measured how the phrases 
‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ interact with the words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’ to affect 
interpretations of the standard. An ANOVA was computed with ‘willing v. hesitate to act’ 
and ‘proof v. doubt’ as the two between-subjects factors and interpretations of RD captured 
by the direct rating method as the dependent measure.  
There were significant main effects of both the ‘willing v. hesitate to act’ phrases and 
the words ‘proof v. doubt’ on interpretations of RD, F(1, 196) = 117.61, p < .001, 2p  = .38 
and F(1, 196) = 6.14, p = .014, 
2
p = .30; respectively. Specifically, interpretations were 
higher under the word ‘proof’ (M = 77.35, SD = 22.76) than ‘doubt’ (M = 37.30, SD = 31.28). 
Interpretations of RD were also higher under the phrase ‘willing to act’ (M = 61.90, SD = 
36.91) than ‘hesitate to act’ (M = 52.75, SD = 30.03). However, these main effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(1, 196) = 15.10, p < .001, 
2
p = .07.  
The interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 3. From one perspective, this shows that 
mean interpretations of RD were lower when the phrase ‘willing to act’ was used in 
conjunction with the word ‘doubt’ (M = 34.70, SD = 34.31) than when ‘willing to act’ was 
used in combination with ‘proof’ (M = 89.10, SD = 8.12). Similarly, interpretations of RD 
were lower when the phrase ‘hesitate to act’ was used in conjunction with the word ‘doubt’ 
(M = 39.90, SD = 28.03) than when it used in combination with ‘proof’ (M = 65.60, SD = 
26.43). In other words, Figure 3 shows that interpretations of RD were lower when the word 
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‘doubt’ was used rather than the word ‘proof’, regardless of whether ‘doubt’ was used in 
conjunction with ‘willing to act’ or ‘hesitate to act’ (for doubt and willing to act: M = 34.70, 
SD = 34.31 for doubt and hesitate to act: M = 39.90, SD = 28.03).  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
In the present paper, we go beyond a descriptive account of RD instructions as well as 
beyond the use of point numerical estimates of RD. We captured the fuzziness of people’s 
interpretations of this standard of proof, and attempted to explain the effect that two RD 
instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’), which have not been previously 
studied, have on interpretations of the standard based on their precise language. As such, our 
work was informed by the theory of linguistic probabilities (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1995; 
Dhami, 2008; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995), and built on the psycholinguistic approach to 
judicial instructions (e.g., Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork et al., 1982; Heffer, 2006; 
Solan, 2001; Power, 1999). 
Like most of the past research on this topic, our evaluation of the effectiveness of RD 
instructions is premised on the notion that the threshold for conviction should be around .90 
(see Blackstone, 1765; Laudan, 2003; McCauliff, 1982; Newman, 1993; United States v. 
Fatico, 1978). We found a significant difference in the effects of the two RD instructions. 
The ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction lowered the standard considerably, while the ‘proof-willing’ 
instruction was interpreted around the desired threshold. This differential effect of the two 
instructions held both when interpretations were measured using the MF method and the 
direct rating method.  
The above findings provide further evidence for the idea that some RD instructions 
may not always be effective (see also e.g., Dhami, 2008; Koch & Devine, 1999; Kramer & 
Koenig, 1990; Montgomery, 1998; Wright & Hall, 2007). In addition, the findings do not 
Instructions on Reasonable Doubt:  17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
support the judicial preference for the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction (e.g., Holland v. US, 1954; 
Poulson v. State of Texas, 1999; Wainwright v. US, 1999). Rather, the above findings imply 
that by reducing the standard of proof below that intended by the law, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ 
instruction is more likely to lead to false convictions than the ‘proof-willing’ instruction. 
Future research could investigate the effect of the two instructions on both individual (juror) 
verdict preferences and group (jury) verdicts. Based on the present findings, we would 
predict that the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction would lead to more convictions. 
Perhaps where RD instructions could be of value are in efforts at reducing the inter- 
and intra-individual variability of interpretations of the standard. However, we found that 
both RD instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’) induced considerable 
variability. According to the MF and direct rating methods, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction 
led to significantly greater inter-individual variability in interpretations of the standard than 
did the ‘proof-willing’ instruction. In addition, according to the MF method, which also 
captures the spread of an individual’s interpretations, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction led to 
significantly greater intra-individual variability in interpretations of RD compared to the 
‘proof-willing’ instruction.  
The findings on variability of interpretations of RD are consistent with past research 
on other RD instructions (Dhami, 2008; Mueller-Johnson et al., 2014). This further 
underscores the fact that RD is a fuzzy concept in jurors’ minds (see Clermont, 1987, 2013; 
Dhami, 2008; Schum, 1986). There are two main (and opposing) implications of these 
findings. On the one hand, jurors may find it more difficult under the ‘doubt-hesitate’ than 
‘proof-willing’ instruction to reach consensus on a post-deliberation verdict due to inter-
individual variability. On the other hand, jurors may be more likely to reach consensus under 
the ‘doubt-hesitate’ than ‘proof-willing’ instruction due to intra-individual variability. Future 
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research could investigate the effect of individual variability in interpretations of RD on 
group (jury) verdicts. 
Finally, we found that the effect of the two RD instructions (i.e., ‘proof-willing’ and 
‘doubt-hesitate’) could be explained by the precise language used in them. The phrase 
‘hesitate to act’ alone (not in the context of either the words ‘proof’ or ‘doubt’) led to lower 
interpretations of RD than did the phrase ‘willing to act’. Similarly, the word ‘doubt’ (not in 
the context of either the phrase ‘willing to act’ or ‘hesitate to act’) led to lower interpretations 
of RD compared to the word ‘proof’. The significant interaction effect of these phrases and 
words revealed that when either the phrases ‘willing to act’ or ‘hesitate to act’ appear in 
combination with the word ‘doubt’ this reduces the standard of proof, compared to when 
these two phrases appear in conjunction with the word ‘proof’. Thus, use of the word ‘doubt’ 
explains why the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction led to lower interpretations of RD than the 
‘proof-willing’ instruction.   
The implication of our findings is that the use of the word ‘doubt’ when defining RD 
ought to be carefully considered, and perhaps even avoided altogether. Indeed, the word 
‘doubt’ is prevalent and focal in many RD instructions. Examples include ‘doubt based on 
reason’, ‘actual and substantial doubt’, and ‘doubt that can be articulated’ (see Hemmens et 
al., 1997). Future research ought to examine the effect of the word ‘doubt’ when used in these 
other instructions.  
One issue that has rarely been considered when discussing the language of RD 
instructions is the idea that they might (inadvertently) define the juror’s (jury’s) task. Earlier, 
we observed that the language of the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions appears 
to guide jurors in the tasks of evidence evaluation and conviction in different ways. The 
‘proof-willing’ instruction appears to ask jurors to consider evidence as providing proof of 
guilt and to act to convict. By contrast, the ‘doubt-hesitate’ instruction appears to ask jurors 
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to consider evidence as signifying doubt in guilt and not act (or hesitate) to convict. In terms 
of conviction, the phrases ‘willing to act’ and ‘hesitate to act’ appear to ask jurors to perform 
an action (i.e., to convict) or not to act (i.e., not to convict), respectively. In terms of evidence 
evaluation, the words ‘proof’ and ‘doubt’ appear to ask jurors to consider evidence as 
providing proof of guilt versus signifying doubt in guilt, respectively. Our findings suggest 
that the task of evidence evaluation (i.e., as finding ‘proof v. doubt’) rather than conviction 
(i.e., ‘willing v. hesitate’) was particularly important in shaping interpretations of RD. 
Despite this, it might be fruitful to consider the task of conviction in future research. 
Some psychological studies suggest that actions are regretted more than inactions, especially 
when they lead to bad outcomes (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), other research finds a 
regret inducing effect of inaction, particularly in the long-term (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 
1994, 1995). Our findings are consistent with the former idea because interpretations of RD 
were higher under the phrase ‘willing to act’ than ‘hesitate to act’, implying that jurors may 
increase the threshold for conviction (i.e., action) in an effort to reduce any anticipated regret. 
Future research could examine the effect of anticipated regret (due to an action effect) on 
interpretations of RD. 
One implication is that the task of evidence evaluation is more closely linked to how 
jurors’ think about the standard of proof than the task of conviction itself. Clermont (2013) 
similarly highlights the importance of the relationship between evidence, beliefs and 
standards of proof. Future research could explore how definitions of other juror tasks that 
appear in RD instructions might affect interpretations of the standard. For instance, some RD 
instructions appear to instruct jurors on how they ought to feel about the defendant and what 
sort of cognitive approach they ought to apply (e.g., the Supreme Court of Canada in R. 
Lifchus [1997] states that RD is not based on ‘sympathy or prejudice’ and that RD should be 
based on ‘reason and commonsense’).  
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Finally, as noted earlier, both the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions are 
typically used in conjunction with the following language: ‘important affairs of life’, which 
we kept constant in the present study. This language is used in around 20 US states, and it has 
been criticized (see Federal Judicial Centre, 1987; Laudan, 2003). It is believed that decisions 
people make in their own important affairs are unlike the decision that jurors ought to make 
in a criminal trial, and that this language trivializes the latter; potentially reducing the 
standard (e.g., Scurry v. US, 1965). Future research may wish to examine the effect of the 
‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions outside the context of the ‘important affairs 
of life’ language. 
Further Implications: To Define or Not to Define RD? 
Opponents of the idea of defining RD for jurors suggest that leaving the standard 
undefined avoids the difficulty in attempting to define it and allows the courts to rely on the 
knowledge of the jury (Notes, 1995). As Heffer (2006, p. 168) points out, judges may advise 
jurors that the words RD are “ordinary everyday words” and thus should be self-explanatory 
(see also Power, 1999). Nevertheless, juries sometimes request a definition (Diamond, 1990; 
Laudan, 2003), and proponents of definition argue that defining the standard of proof for 
jurors is crucial to a fair trial as it ensures that all jurors understand the criterion for 
conviction in a similar way (Cohen, 1995). Some commentators have opted for a middle-
ground in terms of adding a quantitative definition (Elwork, Alfini & Sales, 1982). However, 
courts in jurisdictions such as the US and England and Wales have been firmly opposed to 
quantification (see Laudan, 2003; Power, 1999), and the evidence is mixed as to its 
effectiveness (Dhami, 2008; Kagehiro, 1990; Kramer & Koenig, 1990). 
Although the present findings support the view that qualitative definitions of RD may 
be problematic, past research has shown that there remains sizeable variability in 
interpretations of the standard when it is left undefined (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; 
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Kerr et al., 1976) indicating a lack of understanding, and so need for definition. We argue 
that it is not definition per se that should be the center of debate, but which language is used 
to define RD. We propose an evidence-based approach to RD instructions so that their 
construction is informed by evidence on whether the language in them has desired effects on 
people’s understanding and application of the standard (see also Elwork et al., 1982), and that 
RD instructions are equally effective for different sub-samples of the jury eligible population 
(see also Mueller-Johnson et al., 2014). 
An evidence-based approach can continue to employ the direct rating and MF 
methods to measure and validate phrases that can serve as effective definitions of RD. The 
quantitative interpretations of RD captured by both the direct rating and MF methods have 
been shown to provide reliable and valid measures of RD as they are associated with 
theoretically related concepts such as verdicts and verdict preferences (e.g., see Dane, 1985; 
Dhami, 2008; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; Kerr et al., 1976; Lundrigan et 
al., 2013). The fact that the two methods led to significantly different mean interpretations of 
RD in the present study may simply reflect the fact that the direct rating method asks for the 
minimum probability value that represents the standard, whereas the MF method (peak) is the 
probability value that absolutely substitutes for RD (see also Dhami, 2008). 
Potential Limitations 
 It could be argued that the external validity of the present findings is limited because 
mock jurors were used rather than real jurors; and that we studied the standard of proof 
outside the context of a legal case, and at the pre-deliberation stage. It would be inappropriate 
to study real juries in real trial situations where the standard of proof was manipulated 
experimentally, as we did in the present study. Rather, we used the methodological 
procedures typical of experimental psychological research on jury decision-making (see 
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Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Greene, Chopra & Kovera, 2002). Beyond this, we made a 
concerted effort to minimize the limitations of the method in several ways.  
 First, most past psychological research on jury decision-making in general and 
standards of proof in particular, utilizes student samples (for a review see Devine, Clayton, 
Dunford, Seying & Pryce, 2001). Some studies have shown few differences between mock 
and real jurors (e.g., MacCoun & Kerr 1988; Reifman, Gusick & Ellsworth, 1992). We 
sampled participants from a large, multi-building site company. Although this is not 
equivalent to random sampling from the jury-eligible population (which to our knowledge 
has never been done in past research on this topic), it did afford the opportunity to study a 
wide cross-section of people in a controlled data collection environment. In fact, some of the 
participants had been called for jury service in the past. 
Second, while some past research has measured interpretations of RD in the context 
of simulated criminal cases (e.g., Kagehiro, 1990; Lundrigan et al., 2013), others have not 
(e.g., Martin & Schum, 1987; Mueller-Johnson et al., 2014). Theoretically speaking, the 
interpretation of RD should not vary as a function of case, and Dhami (2008) found no 
significant difference in people’s interpretations of RD in and outside the context of a real 
manslaughter case (see also Lundrigan et al., 2014). If we had studied RD in the context of a 
criminal case our findings would have been potentially limited to that specific type of case. 
Future research, nevertheless, could examine the effect of ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-
hesitate’ instructions in the context of a variety of criminal cases.  
Finally, the past research measuring quantitative interpretations of RD has focused on 
individual-level interpretations (e.g., Koch & Devine, 1999; Wright & Hall, 2007), as we did. 
There is some evidence that interpretations of RD differ very little from pre- to post-
deliberation (Dane, 1985; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996), and the evidence suggests that 
juries do not spend a significant amount of time discussing the meaning of RD during 
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deliberation (e.g., Hastie et al., 1983; Ogloff, 1998). Of course, future research could examine 
the effect of the ‘proof-willing’ and ‘doubt-hesitate’ instructions on deliberating juries. 
Conclusion 
Given that the legal system confers great responsibility on jurors to make decisions 
that may have severe consequences for a defendant’s liberty and for public security, the 
system should be responsible for setting out clearly what it asks of the juror, so that jurors 
can, and are confident that they can, accomplish this task. To date, judicial instructions 
defining the standard of proof for jurors have not been based on any empirical evidence of 
their effectiveness. The legal challenges that have resulted from the use of specific definitions 
have also not been informed by such evidence. We demonstrate the importance of empirical 
research testing the influence of different definitions of RD, and highlight the powerful effect 
that linguistic context can have on their efficacy.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Interpretations of RD under Existing 
Judicial Instructions 
 
 M (SD) 
Proof-Willing (n = 50) Doubt-Hesitate (n = 50) 
Direct Rating 89.10 (8.12) 39.90 (28.04) 
MF Peak 94.63 (10.71) 79.13 (24.67) 
MF Minimum 41.38 (25.97) 19.38 (20.36) 
MF Spread 58.50 (26.02) 80.38 (20.30) 
Note. Ten participants did not provide complete data for the MF method. 
  
Instructions on Reasonable Doubt:  32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example membership function for RD 
Figure 2. Membership function method  
Figure 3. Mean interpretations of RD under the ‘willing-hesitate to act’ phrases and ‘proof-
doubt’ words 
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